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On the Balance Between International Law and Democratic
Sovereignty
Daniel W. Drezner*

I. INTRODUCTION
The competition for authority between national sovereignty and international
law has waxed and waned for centuries. Precursors to the modem nation-state rose to
prominence in Europe by battling the Catholic Church, feudal suzerains, and
commercial leagues for the right to rule.' Even the documents underlying the Treaty
of Westphalia, thought to represent a watershed in the rise of the state, are shot
through with violations of state sovereignty. As the state has acquired more power as
an institution, there has been a recurring tension between nations wishing to assert
their own sovereignty while using international law as a way of weakening the
sovereignty of others. Great powers constantly face the choice of maxmizing their
sovereign powers in an anarchic world or sacrificing some degree of sovereignty in the
hope of constructing a stable order through multilateral institutions.'
This tension has existed for some time, but has escalated in the past few decades
for three reasons. First, the sovereignty that is contested is increasingly democratic in
nature. A century ago one could count the number of democracies on one hand;
today the number of governments claiming a democratic mantle is well over a
hundred.4 Citizens of democracies are naturally reluctant to cede decisionmaking
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authority to unelected international bodies unless the benefits of doing so are crystal
clear.
Second, the demand for international law has increased with the rise of economic
globalization and transnational nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs").
Globalization has increased the degree and intensity of international economic
exchange by several orders of magnitude. With this comes a demand for rules to
govern these exchanges. This includes the need to settle trade disputes between
nations, but also a desire by actors to harmonize different national regulatory schemes.
Transnational NGOs have emerged to demand stronger international regimes to
govern these issues. In the past decade alone, the number of transnational NGOs has
quadrupled.' NGOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the International
Commission ofJurists are pushing for a codification of international norms governing
a variety of issue areas.
Third, the supply of international organizations and treaties that make
international law has increased. A century ago, there were very few standing
international organizations. Since then, the UN system has grown in size, the
Bretton Woods institutions have entrenched themselves, and a welter of international
and regional regulatory organizations has come into creation.' In the past twenty
years, the number of international governmental organizations ("IGOs") and
emanations has more than doubled, as has the number of treaties deposited in the
United Nations. There is a growing epistemic community of experts on international
law eager to expand its empirical domain. There are more formal avenues for
international law to be created than ever before.
The question for democratic governments is how to balance serving the national
will through democratic means with meeting international obligations that may be
objectionable at points but are believed to advance the national interest in the long
run. There are plenty of examples of governments acquiescing to international law in
the face of vocal domestic opposition. The United States has had to void components
of the Clean Air Act because of a World Trade Organization ("WTO") ruling.
Yugoslavia arrested its former ruler, Slobodan Milosevic, in response to extradition
demands by a UN War Crimes Tribunal. Japan has banned the commercial hunting
of whales to comply with the dictates of the International Whaling Commission.
These are clear cases where national governments have acceded to a policy that would
have been politically difficult or impossible to implement through purely domestic
mechanisms.
Some commentators argue that, with such results, international law is making a
sure and steady encroachment on democratic sovereignty, affecting the United States
5.
6.
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in particular' Officials at the highest levels have implicitly acknowledged this trend.
In 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed the problem this way:
"Great nations who understand the importance of sovereignty at various times cede
portions of it in order to achieve some better good for the country.'
This paper asks two questions. First, is it the case, as some have daimed, that
principles of democratic sovereignty are eroding at the expense of international law
principles? I argue that international law is increasingly utilized to circumvent
sovereignty, even if such sovereignty is democratic in origin. However, it should be
recognized that the actors most responsible for this trend are not NGOs, epistemic
communities of international lawyers, or the United Nations, but the great powers of
the world, namely the United States and the members of the European Union! The
United States in particular has been adept at fashioning and marketing standards of
international law that serve its interests, through a growing number of international
governmental organizations. US sacrifices of democratic sovereignty pale in
comparison to the compromises other countries have had to make. Furthermore, the
Urited States and European Union employ diplomatic, economic, and other forms of
coercion to codify their preferences in international law.
The second question addresses the normative ramifications of this trend. In the
long run, what are the implications of this use of international law for democratic
governance and international relations more generally? Here the record is mixed.
The recent wave of international law has and will generate some beneficial results. In
the short run, however, this approach will prove problematic for democratic
sovereignty; in the long run, the coercive origins of these laws have created a legal
foundation of questionable durability.
II. DEFINING TERMS

Sovereignty is a multifaceted term."° For the purposes of this article, sovereignty
endows a government with the power to regulate the affairs of a well-defined territory
and its resident population without interference from organizations or individuals
external to the jurisdiction. In other words, a sovereign state has the final say on the
rule of law within its territory. Democratic sovereignty implies that the governing
authorities derive their legitimacy from citizen preferences. These preferences could
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be expressed through popular referenda or through the election of official
representatives. The key is that the mechanism through which these preferences are
divined occurs on a regular basis and is free from coercion.
There are two sources of international law governing the activity of sovereign
states. The first source consists of the treaties, agreements, and conventions signed
between sovereign states. Treaties require ratification by national legislatures, and
thus are not seen to reduce national sovereignty automatically. Some legal scholars
have voiced concerns about the ability of treaty law to conflict with democratic
sovereignty, because of the all-or-nothing nature of their ratification." However, the
no-amendment rule can also apply to some categories of domestic legislation.
Furthermore, most treaties also include clauses permitting signatories to renounce
their treaty obligations so long as prior notification is given. Fears about the threat to
democratic sovereignty may be based on the normative content of the treaties rather
than the mechanism of ratification.
Customary international law is established when courts decide that certain
practices or norms are shared widely enough such that they reflect a common custom
of states. If a custom is widely embraced by the community of nations, courts can
identify this custom as a source of law in their decisions. The key question, of course,
is how to identify such norms and principles and to measure just how widely shared
they are. No doubt, there exists a core set of norms that jurists could identif-the
outlawing of slavery or the illegality of torture, for example. Most norms, however,
are not as widely accepted. Scholars and jurists can search for them within national
legislation and international treaties, but many also look for them in the "soft law" of
UN General Assembly resolutions, International Monetary Fund ("IMF") codes and
standards, G-20 communiques, or other multilateral political documents.
III. NGOs, EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Revisionist scholars of international law claim that unelected, unrepresentative
groups advocate the use of customary international law as a means of bypassing
democratic sovereignty. 2 Some go so far as to point out that, since an element of
customary law is the body of academic writings on the subject, scholars of
international law can form an epistemic community of their own, with shared norms
about the utility and application of the law. Professor Louis Sohn supports this
contention, arguing that "states really never make international law on the subject of
human rights. It is made by the people that care; the professors, the writers of

11.
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textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in leading international law
journals."'3
There is no question that NGOs and other private actors have tried to use
international law as a mechanism for advancing their interests. However, two points
need to be made on this subject. First, private actors have relied more on treaty
ratification than customary international law in advancing their agenda. NGOs
embrace the power of norms, primarily to pressure recalcitrant states into ratifying
treaties. Some tensions between democratic sovereignty and treaty law may exist but
these concepts are certainly not antithetical. Second, the success of private actors in
their endeavors has largely been dependent on the willingness of important nationstates to sign onto their agenda.

The most prominent examples come from the area of human rights law. NGOs
have loudly advocated adherence to the UN human rights treaties, including the 1966
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights of 1966, and the 1989 Covenant on the Rights of Child. In addition
to the UN treaties, human rights groups have also promoted the role of the European
Convention on Human Rights in establishing human rights law, for citizens of the
European Union. Activists have tried to use this base of treaties to argue that US
courts should apply human rights law beyond its borders." The success of these
instruments cannot be denied. As of June 2000, 138 countries had ratified all three
UN covenants. All EU members accept that the European Convention on Human
Rights supercedes their own laws on human rights issues. Basket Three of the 1975
Helsinki Final Act, requiring signatory states to respect their citizens' human rights,
unwittingly sowed the seeds of communism's collapse fifteen years later.
Some political scientists attribute this growth in transnational human rights law
to the growth of NGOs, epistemic communities, or transnational activist networks.'
What is relevant to our discussion is bow these groups have promoted the use of
international law. Human rights have advanced largely through the ratification of
treaties, as opposed to the use of customary international law.'5 Elected
13.
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representatives did not draft the various UN and EU conventions, but they approved
them in order for the law to take effect. It is difficult to argue that treaties signed by
the head of government and ratified by the appropriate legislative body constitute an
infringement of democratic sovereignty. Theories of democracy that permit the
delegation of decision-making powers to elected officials must respect the decisions
made by those officials.
The attention paid to the role of NGOs also overlooks the important role of the
great powers in ensuring broad acceptance of human rights norms. Both the United
States and the European Union have threatened or applied economic sanctions
against egregious human rights offenders for the past thirty years 7 In the 1980s,
Congress passed three laws mandating sanctions against US trading partners that
systematically violated core labor standards."5 EU governments have also linked
human rights to preferential trade status. Certainly these instances of economic
coercion have contributed to the broader acceptance of human rights law. Moreover,
since the targets of coercive pressure are by definition authoritarian governments, one
cannot say that democratic sovereignty has been compromised. NGOs and
transnational activist networks have played a role in the development of international
human rights law. Without the backing of powerful states, however, NGO pressure
is not particularly powerful.' 9
A similar argument about the encroaching power of international law has been
made regarding environmental initiatives. Peter Haas argues that an epistemic
community, based in the UN Environmental Program, elite research institutes, and
national governments, was responsible for persuading governments to agree to the
Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone. 2° Similar narratives have been used to
explain the international whaling regime, the 1992 biodiversity convention, and the
Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gases."
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A closer look at this area raises questions about whether NGOs are that
powerful and whether democratic sovereignty has been violated. First, the influence
of NGOs and private actors is open to question. Just as NGOs have increased their
prominence, sovereign states have increased their ability to marginalize troublesome
NGOs. Analyses of the various environmental UN conferences reveal that over time
states have become adept at excluding various NGO groups from key bargaining
sessions. 22 The inclusion of other professional groups, including economists and
corporate lobbyists, also undercuts the power of environmental activists.:
Second, the law here is growing largely through treaty ratification, not through
customary international law. One could argue that the declarations produced by UN
conferences are an attempt to use customary law as a way of bypassing democratic
institutions. However, this overlooks the constraints that domestic legal institutions
place upon international environmental accords. Case studies of fallout from the 1992
Rio Summit suggest that countries implement environmental accords only to the
extent permitted by their domestic political institutions In the case of the Kyoto
Protocol, objections in the United States about the treaty's costs of implementation
and the distribution of costs led the Bush administration to reject ratification of the
treaty. These actions highlight the fact that when international environmental law
has moved forward, it has only occurred with the backing of the great powers. While
NGOs do play a role in persuading powerful states to alter their policies, so do other
factors, such as the material costs and benefits ofsuch treaties.
Intriguingly, international trade law has proven to be a roadblock for
environmental groups attempting to apply US environmental regulations in an
extraterritorial fashion. On three separate instances, WTO panels have overturned
portions of US laws because they were applied to foreign jurisdictions in a
discriminatory manner. These rulings spurred the large-scale street protests in Seattle
during the 1999 WTO ministerial meetings. International relations theorists and
legal scholars point out that an even more environmentally sensitive WTO would
have ruled against the United States on these cases. :5 These rulings also point to an

22.
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interesting problem private actors face in trying to use customary international law,
namely that conflicting bodies of international law can act as a constraint on the
ability of any single set of customary principles to dominate.
Two other examples are frequently cited in demonstrating the power of private
actors in pushing international law. The first is the development of the international
treaty to ban the use of land mines. This case is distinct from human rights or the
environment, in that the origins of this law clearly lie with NGOs, as sovereign states
were relative latecomers to this campaign. 26 Even in this case the strategy was to
negotiate a treaty, not to promote customary international law. It should also be
pointed out that the governments actually relying on land mines to advance or defend
their national interests, including the United States, refused to ratify the treaty. As
with other issue areas, NGOs have only been successful in reinforcing coalitions of the
willing. Beyond that coalition, the rise and fall of international law rests on the
distribution of power in the international system.
Finally, there is the Rome statute creating the International Criminal Court.
Again, NGOs and an epistemic community of international law scholars are
commonly cited as the drivers behind the drafting of this treaty, although this tends to
minimize the Clinton administration's promotion of the treaty in its earliest stages.
Nevertheless, the treaty does state that once a sufficient number of states ratify the
convention, it can be applied against citizens of states that choose not to ratify it. This
is a clear case where international law could be used to contravene democratic
sovereignty in the future. Its creation appears to have encouraged the expansion of
legal justifications for trying individuals for human rights abuses conducted outside a
particular court's jurisdiction. This can be seen in the British court ruling against
former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, as well as the arrest, trial, and conviction
in Belgium of four Rwandans accused of facilitating genocide.
What is particularly interesting about the International Criminal Court is that it
combines both components of international law. There is clearly a treaty component,
in that a specified number of states must ratify the Rome convention before it applies
to non-signatories. However, it also relies on customary law via the logic that if sixty
states ratify the convention, there exists a sufficiently shared norm to justify violations
of non-signatories' sovereignty. This intriguing combination of treaties and custom
could be a harbinger of more innovative tactics by NGOs and other private actors to
codify international law. However, private actors did not invent this approach. Other

Jeffrey Dunoff, Reconciling InternationalTrade with Preservationof the Global Commons: Can We Prosper
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actors in world politics have been extremely adept at combining treaty and custom to
advance their interests, namely the United States and the European Union.

IV. AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN USES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the past fifteen years, the United States and European Union have displayed
an impressive dexterity in using international law to advance their interests on the
world stage, even if doing so violates the sovereignty of other nations. Across several
issue areas, the United States has mixed treaty, custom, and coercion as means of
pushing international law towards desired ends. Furthermore, the United States is
adept at "forum-shopping" among different international governmental organizations
to advance its preferred set of international laws. The European Union and its
members are latecomers to these practices, but have eagerly embraced them.
On trade issues, both the United States and the European Union have used
unilateral threats and regional initiatives as a way of converting their preferences into
accepted trade law. In the 1980s, the United States had difficulty overcoming
protectionist barriers in other countries using traditional General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") procedures.
Furthermore, through the Single
European Act, France and Germany seemed bent on creating a "Fortress Europe" to
block American exports, while creating a large enough market to dictate global
economic rules.' In response, the US government dramatically increased unilateral
coercive action through Section 301 of US trade law to force countries to end
restrictive trading practices. Free trade agreements were also signed with Israel,
Canada, and Mexico. These actions caused concern in other countries that the
United States was willing to walk away from the multilateral trading system. The
specter of an America unshackled by these rules was enough to rattle major trading
states.' The Uruguay round of trade negotiations led to the creation of the WTO,
with a set of dispute resolution rules that largely reflect American preferences.
There is a similar pattern with regard to protecting human rights and enforcing
the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia. At first, the UN Security Council provided
the legal mandate and organized attempts to implement its resolutions. These efforts
to keep the peace and end ethnic cleansing proved futile in Bosnia. The United States
chose to act through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), and was
able to get the warring parties to agree at Dayton to end the violence. In the case of
Kosovo, the United States rejected the United Nations and acted exclusively through
NATO. Relying on a very loose interpretation of prior Security Council resolutions,
NATO used military coercion to force Yugoslavia into backing down. With Kosovo,
27.
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the United States used a narrower multilateral grouping to attack a nation that was
clearly in violation of international norms regarding the treatment of minorities. In
other words, the United States used NATO to enforce customary international law.
A similar pattern emerges in the development of an international regime to guard
against money laundering. In 1986, the United States was the first country to make
money laundering a crime. In 1989, the G-7 countries created the Financial Action
Task Force ("FATF") to develop a set of recommended best practices affecting
financial supervision and regulation, appropriate law enforcement guidelines, and
protocols for international cooperation. These practices were called the FATF Forty
Recommendations ("FATF 40"). FATF lobbied to enlarge the number of countries
recognizing the FATF 40 as an accepted standard through the encouragement of
FATF-style regional bodies. For those jurisdictions that resisted, in June 2000 FATF
initiated an exercise to "name and shame" countries with inadequate money
laundering standards. In the summer of 2001, both FATF and the G-7 threatened to
implement countermeasures unless these countries enacted and implemented
legislation corresponding to the FATF 40.29
This mix of policies has helped to produce customary international law. As of
May 2000, over 10 international bodies, representing over 140 countries and
territories, acknowledge the FATF 40 as the accepted international standard to
prevent money laundering. At their Spring 2001 meetings, the IMF and the World
Bank also conferred their recognition on the FATF 40, despite vociferous objections
from China and Russia.' All of the fifteen jurisdictions "named and shamed" br
FATF in June 2000 have enacted some form of anti-money laundering legislation.
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In this instance, the United States used a mixture of coordination and coercion, and
treaty and custom to create international law.
The European Union has also been Willing to use international law to
circumvent democratic sovereignty. This can be seen in the internal structure of the
European Union. Even observers sympathetic to the EU project have qualms about
the democratic deficit. One sympathetic observer summarizes the current situation as
follows:
[T]he European Central Bank and the European Court of Justice have exercised
coercive powers with only the slimmest links to elected representatives, let alone to
citizens at the grassroots. The decision-taking Council of Ministers has been
responsible to no one: not to the Commission; not to the Parliament, not (as a
collective body) to a multicountry electorate!2
EU members are comfortable with the external promotion of international law.
As Jeremy Rabkin points out: "Just as democratic states like to be surrounded by
other democracies in the world, the European Union may seek to encourage similar
structures that place great authority in supranational hybrid structures."" Europe
strongly supported the creation of the International Criminal Court, with its ability to
violate the sovereignty of non-ratifying states. EU countries have also been the
primary backers of an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") initiative to crack down on harmful tax practices by offshore financial
centers. Jurisdictions with minimal tax regimes such as Barbados or Monaco pose a
threat to high-tax Europe. In June 2000, the OECD named thirty-five jurisdictions as
having harmful tax policies, and threatened "defensive measures" against those regimes
that refuse to amend their practices."
The EU has also been the strongest supporter of the "precautionary principle" in
international environmental law. The principle states that potentially dangerous
activities can be restricted or prohibited before they are scientifically proven to cause
serious damage. The EU cited the principle as customary international law in its
appeal to the WTO on its import ban of US beef treated with growth hormones.
Failing to convince the WTO Appellate Body, EU members were more successful in
codifying the principle by treaty. In January 2000, the Cartegena Protocol on
Biosafety endorsed using the precautionary principle in the treatment of large
modified organisms.
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The United States and the European Union have constructed international law
consistent with their preferences through an interesting mechanism. Developing an
immediate consensus in universal membership organizations can be extremely
difficult. To facilitate consensus, the great powers first ensure agreement among a
coalition of the willing. It finds this coalition of the willing through the creation and
use of more exclusive organizations such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") or FATF. It then uses these more exclusive organizations,
and their members, to coerce or entice resisting sovereign states into agreement. This
process generates an interlocking series of statements, conventions and communiques
that can be viewed as custom. International law is not only enforced through
coercion; these cases show that it is sometimes created through coercion.
V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

International law appears to be making inroads into the power of sovereign
states, many of them democracies. However, the instigator behind this advance of
international law is not an unelected group of non-governmental organizations or legal
scholars, but the United States, the world's oldest and most powerful democracy, and
the European Union, which houses the birthplace of democracy. This fact raises
some complex normative implications. While there are clear benefits from this recent
expansion of international law, there are just as many problems.
The benefits from the advance of international law are significant. There arc
clear cases where the advance of international law has helped to preserve democratic
sovereignty from antidemocratic impulses. The Southern Cone Common Market,
MERCOSUR, contains a clause in its founding Treaty of Asunci6n that all members
must be democracies. The clear threat of expulsion from MERCOSUR helped to
avert an 1996 coup d'etat in Paraguay.6 Estonia and Latvia altered their laws to make
it easier for Russian residents to acquire citizenship because of a threat of exclusion
from the Council of Europe.Y For Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join
NATO, they had to commit to civilian control over their militaries. In each of these
cases, international law and international organizations provided a structure of
incentives for states to reinforce their democratic underpinnings.3
It also should be pointed out that one motive behind these forays into
international law is to combat undemocratic sovereignty. International law can be
used to coerce autocratic regimes into democratizing. NATO actions in Bosnia and
36.
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Kosovo were dearly designed to force out illiberal leaders in the Bosnian Serb republic
and Serbia itself

The International Labor Organization's condemnation of

Myanmar's violation of core labor standards is designed to force that regime to ease its
repressive tendencies. In other instances, the idea is to force authoritarian regimes to
respect international law in the hopes that these states will respect the rule of law
more generally. A persuasive case can be made that Mexico's Institutionalized
Revolutionary Party's fall from power was related to its entry into NAFTA. This is a
key argument for those advocating China's entry into the WTO.
Finally, the use of international law by the United States has helped to advance
and cement American interests through the creation of international organizations.
The United States has sacrificed some of its own democratic sovereignty in the recent
expansion of international law. In the process, however, it has reaped far greater
benefits by ensuring multilateral cooperation on trade rules, human rights, money
laundering, and core labor standards. The United States has also created
international institutions such as the OECD and NATO that support US positions
on global governance. Hegemonic states that seek a constitutional basis for world
order are able to lock in their preferences for a longer period of time than states
managing their foreign affairs without international institutions." For those
interested in promoting democratic sovereignty, it is a far, far better thing for the
United States to be the chief progenitor of international law than, say, the People's
Republic of China."
There are also some disturbing implications that emerge from the statesponsored expansion of international law, especially for democratic sovereignty. The
development of international law in the past decade feeds the preternatural liberal
faith in centralized elites and hierarchies at the expense of more decentralized
approaches to law and governance. The more the United States succeeds in creating
top-down legal standards, the more such attempts will be made in the future. There
is only a limited set of circumstances where centralized hierarchies are appropriate for
creating and enforcing international law. Other mechanisms such as decentralized
contracting by private actors or jurisdictional competition among sovereign states are
often the appropriate way to coordinate different bodies of law."' However, these
approaches are disdained by academics due to the lack of overt political cooperation.
An elite belief in the "expansive structurationf' of centralized control could drown out
alternative coordination mechanisms."
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The emphasis on coercion behind many of these international initiatives is also
troubling for the long run. Scratch the surface, and it is surprising how much
transnational law is created through military, economic, and diplomatic coercion.
This has occurred in issues as diverse as labor standards, harmful tax practices,
intellectual property rights, and the environment. This reliance on coercion comes at
the expense of alternative means of advancing the rule of law, such as contracting or
persuasion. Historically, international regimes created through coercion are brittle,
collapsing if shifts occur in the underlying distribution of power. Regimes created
through norms of reciprocity or consensus building have a longer shelf life, as rising
powers are co-opted into an existing set of rules." Thus, much of what passes for
international law is uniquely vulnerable to fluctuations in US power.
The lessons of this form of law-creation for fledgling democracies are also
troubling. A large number of countries are still struggling with democratic practices,
and look to the United States and other shapers of international law for guidance.
The templates they are deriving from this new wave of codified international law
support centralized rules requiring the government to regulate vast areas of human
activity. For example, the states of Central and Eastern Europe, having thrown off the
shackles of totalitarianism, are now being asked to create entirely new leviathans so
they can join the European Union and cement their democratic transitions. New
democracies viewing recent trends in international law will be more than willing to
cede their sovereignty to international bureaucracies.
Another disturbing ramification is the effect that this wave of international law
could have on federalism.
International law imposes mandates on national
governments without mention as to how they should be implemented. Central
governments could use these laws as tools to strip power away from local authorities.
Even the United States, which has advocated these laws, is not immune to this
problem. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, for example, have the
potential to conflict with Delaware's laws governing the incorporation of businesses.
If federal regulators had a choice, they would prefer to see Delaware's laws
compromised rather than the OECD Principles. Given the uncertain case law on this
subject, the threat of the federal government using international law to bypass state
and local institutions is very real.
Perhaps the most pernicious effect of recent trends in international law is the
proliferation of international and national bureaucracies. When the United States
fashions a new international organization as a vehicle for advancing new rules and
regulations, that institution persists. International organizations rarely die, even if
and when they outlive their utility. This is particularly true for those organizations
with secretariats and physical assets under their control. One observer notes, "The
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UN Charter's slogan of'we the people of the world' still only thinly disguises a reality
of 'we the bureaucrats the world.'"' The result is, at best, a lot of bureaucratic
deadwood on the international stage, draining countries of resources, time, and
patience. At worst, these organizations become well-connected advocacy groups with
little to no accountability to anyone, expecting to be treated like states. The result is a
situation where a significant share of an international organization's membership is
made up of other international organizations. For example, 35 percent of the Financial
Stability Forum's membership consists of other international institutions, groupings,
and committees.
Furthermore, regulatory coordination often leads to the creation of new
bureaucracies at the national level in order to implement multilateral agreements." A
certain degree of regulation is necessary for any economy, but the recent wave of
international law lets a thousand regulatory agencies bloom. The deleterious effects of
such bureaucratic proliferation for a democratic society are legion, and have been
discussed elsewhere.'
And as difficult as it is to shut down international
organizations, eliminating established national bureaucracies is next to impossible.
VI. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The power of international law should not be exaggerated. In the past decade,
there have been instances in which a government has opted to retain democratic
sovereignty rather than agree to the codification of international law. Great Britain
chose not to join the European Monetary Union. The United States Senate rejected
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Norway continues to hunt
whales commercially despite the International Whaling Commission's ban on such
activity. The Russian Federation violated the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
in order to move troops to secessionist provinces in the Caucasus. The question of
whether international law vill persistently trump democratic sovereignty remains
open to debate.
Nevertheless, the growing influence of international law should not be ignored.
NGOs are often cited as the source of much of this body of law, but this confuses
advocacy with power. A closer look at recent developments in international law
suggests that the biggest promoters of international la,, in both its treaty and
customary form are the United States and the EU countries. In many issue areas,
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states are using a mix of coordination and coercion to fashion new law. This recent
wave of international law violates democratic sovereignty both in its desired ends and
in its means of creation. There is no doubt that much of this law is designed to
promote the global public good. However, its coercive origins must give even its
creators pause about the whether the purchase is worth the price.
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